Since the 8th Century B.C., the area today called Afghanistan has incessantly been roiled by external invasion or internal strife. Geography had placed it such that it became a natural theatre of the Great Games between imperial powers fighting to control trade routes and expand influence as well as the object of a political Buzkashi between local feuding elites. Great emperors like Darius I, Alexander, Kanishka, Genghis Khan, Timur, Babur and Nadir Shah all fought their way through Afghanistan. Yet it has never been completely conquered or colonised. This is the paradox of Afghanistan - most invaded and yet unconquerable. Because of this, regimes were always weak and susceptible to foreign pressure. Yet its society has been resilient and uncompromising towards alien rule. How does one then explain the Afghan paradox? There are a number of contextual factors such as its rugged topographical features, existence of deep and multifaceted cleavages among the population, the centrality of tribal social groupings, and the negative role played by neighbours and external powers. However, central to this paradox is the inhibited development of political institutions in Afghanistan.
The foundations of the modern Afghan state are said to have been laid by Ahmad Shah Durrani in the 18th Century . A central role was played by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan who was called 'Iron Amir' for his brutality and ruthless expansionism. Over the years, Afghan rulers have utilised the discourses of Islam, tribe, kinship, Durrani supremacy and Pashtun nationalism to legitimise their rule. However, the dominant feature of Afghan polity has been internal colonialism by a Pashtun (especially Durrani Pashtun) dominated political culture. The Taliban in many ways represented a culmination of this trend. This lies at the root of the deep ethnic fissures that are central to Afghanistan.
A weak Afghanistan has served the interests of all, right from the Mughal-Safavid rivalry, the power politics between Czarist Russia and Great Britain and the Pakistani search for 'strategic depth' . It was the theatre where the Cold War was played out by the Americans and the Soviet Union. This lack of a centre and weak political institutions is crucial in the context of the various external invasions that have taken place; external powers have mostly been successful in capturing major cities like Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. But external occupation has always failed when faced with guerrilla opposition in the countryside. Historically , the Afghan concept of authority has based on tribal lines. Central leadership has been more like a 'first among equals' rather than a more hierarchal structure as has been the case in India or Iran. Moreover, being an arid and agriculturally poor region, there has never been sufficient resources for the creation of centralized state institutions. Therefore, there has been limited political institutionalisation and penetration of the society by the state. As a result, regimes such as that of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and the Taliban showed their 'strength' by public displays of power such as brutal punitive punishments and moral policing.
Factors such as topography and the tribe-centered nature of society cannot be changed. Therefore, the focus of any efforts at securing a stable future for Afghanistan should be on creating stable political institutions. Free and fair elections are an important step in this direction. But as recent attempts at negotiating with the Taliban indicate, the way to political power in Afghanistan is still through the barrel of a Kalashnikov. There is a long way to go before Afghanistan moves beyond the Great Game and the political buzkashi.
THE GREAT GAME
Coined by Arthur Conolly, an intelligence officer of the British East India Company, the term "The Great Game" acquired widespread popularity thanks to Rudyard Kipling's novel, Kim (first published in 1901). It referred to the strategic rivalry between Britain and Russia for supremacy in Central Asia, which began around 1813. Worried about the prospect of a Russian invasion of India, the British were determined to maintain Afghanistan as a buffer state. Constant efforts were made by the British and Russians to influence the politics of Afghanistan , through diplomacy, espionage and occasionally, force. The British twice attacked Afghanistan. The first war (1839-42 ) ended in disaster with just one Briton, Dr William Brydon, surviving a retreat begun by a 16,000-strong contingent. The second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-80 ) was more successful, ensuring British control of Afghanistan's foreign policy. The classic Great Game ended with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, under which Russia accepted Britain's control over Afghanistan, as long as the British did not attempt any regime change.
Courtesy: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-02-06/south-asia/28149222_1_power-politics-afghanistan-paradox
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