by R. Cholan
Current Indian analysts mesmerized by the famed Sinhala
hospitality may not fully comprehend all of this. The new chumminess is
interpreted as Sri Lanka’s final acceptance of India’s regional
super-power status. Given past history, and the subliminal Indophobia
that still exists, this is an obviously flawed assumption.... President
Jayewardene once said at a news conference in Hong Kong, “the Sri Lankan
government will accept help from the devil himself” to fight the
Tamils. Currently, the Sinhala leaders are consorting with the Indian
'devil' for this help.
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One of my earliest memories of the Colombo harbor was of a large
graffiti on a wall (facing the sea and the ships), which read: “INDIA GO
HOME”.
I grew up in Colombo in the forties and fifties, witnessing the many
manifestations of Indophobia in Sri Lanka. It was called Ceylon then.
The Indophobia of that era was not limited to graffities – it was
everywhere. The Sinhala disdain for anything Indian was open and
omnipresent. All Indians were called
Kalla-Thonis, a
derogatory term coined originally to describe smugglers and illegal
immigrants. Even in the educated middle-class households this term was
freely used to describe Indians.
Indian traders, who were in the country in significant numbers at
that time and patronized regularly by the Ceylon Tamils, were shunned by
the Sinhalese. Indian grocery-stores had hardly any Sinhala customers.
Indian textile merchants sold their saris only to Ceylon Tamil customers
and the Sinhalese bought theirs from Sinhala owned shops. Indian
restaurants were frequented mostly by Tamils, except for a few Sinhalese
who bought ‘one’ Dosa (for 10-cents) in the sixties, for the
‘unlimited’
sambar and
sambal that
came free with it! At the Sinhala owned Restaurants, a bread-meal (1/4
lb of bread for 25-cents) got them only two small dishes of
parippu and
sambol – No seconds!
Analysts who today sing the praises of a healthy Indo-Lanka trade
relationship probably have no idea of what I am talking about. They were
not there then to know. Perhaps a simple chat with a Tamil clerk, who
lived in the Sinhala towns at that time, would be illuminative to these
pundits. Any Indian who cares about the future Indo-Lanka relationship
must research the events of that era.
Quite apart from the ordinary Sinhala citizen’s scorn towards the
Indian traders, there also existed a state level Indophobia. From the
fifties on, a series of measures were taken by successive Sri Lanka
governments to make life harder for the traders from the south Indian
states of Madras and Kerala. The end result – by the mid-sixties these
Indian traders had completely disappeared from Sri Lanka.
The first of these administrative acts was the requirement that all
non-Ceylonese businessmen register themselves, for a fee of Rs. 400.00, a
huge burden to these small time traders from India at that time. Indian
grocers, who eked out meager profits by selling Indian eggs for
18-cents, as opposed to the local price of 21-cents, couldn’t afford
this fee. Most chose to leave the country.
Imports of groceries and magazines from India were then banned – not
just deterred with increased tariffs, but a complete ban. Readers of
Indian magazines, like
Femina (English) and
Kalki
(Tamil), couldn’t get them anymore. What the hell, these readers were
only a miniscule minority and besides most were Tamils. Those who could
afford it got them in the black-market anyway, and the rest of the
readers didn’t matter.

Jawaharlal Nehru |
Ironically, Tamil farmers in the north Sri Lanka welcomed the ban on
Indian onions, as the price of Jaffna onions skyrocketed (as did their
profits), little realizing what the Sinhala government was doing. When
the Sinhala farmers started growing onions, the transport of onions from
Jaffna was bottlenecked at the Elephant Pass army checkpoint, with a
‘permit’ requirement. Those in Jaffna (me included) ate onions for
breakfast, lunch and dinner! Indian onions were nowhere to be seen.
The Indophobia of that era also resulted in the Sinhala government
going after the so called Tamils of ‘recent’ Indian origin. These
immigrant plantation workers imported by the British more than a hundred
years earlier had already been stripped of their Ceylon citizenship by a
prior legislation – the first Legislative Act of the newly independent
Ceylon in 1948. Since then, these Tamils had been living in Ceylon as
‘stateless’ persons.
India came under increasing pressure from the Sinhala leadership to
accept a forced repatriation of these stateless Tamils. The first Indian
PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, who had resisted the pressure effectively, died
in 1964. A weak leadership that followed, and the fact that India was
distracted at that time by a war with China, gave the Sinhala leadership
the best opportunity to ratchet-up the pressure. The new Prime Minister
Lal Bahadur Shastri caved-in, agreeing to accept more than 50% of the
stateless Tamils (Sirimavo-Shastri Pact; October 1964). Over 500,000
Tamil plantation workers were forcibly deported.

Lal Bahadur Shastri |
Intoxicated with this success, Sri Lanka was relentless against its
large neighbor, and succeeded on many fronts. The island of Kachchativu,
a piece of Indian Territory, was wrenched from India in 1974 with
similar pressure tactics. It must be remembered that the wrangle for
this piece of Indian land occurred less than three years after the first
JVP insurrection (1970), when India was the first to come to the rescue
of the Colombo government. That’s Gratitude.
The next major issue with India was when India came to help in the
ethnic conflict in 1987, and ended up eating humble pie. Lured by one
president to help fight the Tamil rebels, India was booted out by the
next, who mockingly joined hands with the same rebels to kick India out.
It was a classic example of Sinhala leaders’ penchant to renege on
solemnly signed agreements.
If India's meek and complete acquiescence to its little neighbor is
to keep out its northern detractors from the island, it is obviously a
failed strategy. India never enjoyed a reciprocal loyalty from the Sri
Lankans. Contrarily, the Chinese and the Pakistani presence and
influence in Sri Lanka have been significant and at present growing
alarmingly.
It is hoped, at the highest echelons in India, that helping Sri Lanka
fight the Tamils will somehow diminish the Chinese and Pakistani
influence there, at least in the short-term. Quite apart from the fact
that this policy has not produced the desired results even in the
short-run, the long-term outlook for India if Sri Lanka wins the war
against the Tamils is even gloomier.
A strong Tamil presence in the Sri Lankan polity (either federal or
as separate countries) is India's best bet. It is the only way India can
counterbalance the congenital and hereditary Sinhala Indophobia.
I base this on another of my early childhood memories in Sri Lanka.
It is about my own home and that of my relatives and friends. Every
Tamil home during that period had a framed photo of Mahatma Gandhi
displayed in their living rooms. Many had pictures of other Indian
leaders, like Jawaharlal Nehru, Subash Chandra Bose, etc. as well. In
some cases these were kept in their shrine rooms among pictures of their
gods. No Sinhala home ever had pictures of Indian leaders.
Sri Lankan Tamils are the natural allies of India. The Sinhalese are
congenitally and hereditarily ill-disposed towards India, perhaps their
attitude being rooted in the historical memories of invasions in
centuries past, or the
Mahavamsa teachings, or
whatever. Merits of these dissimilar dispositions apart, it is the
ground reality. It is something that India needs to understand and
recognize, or ignore at its own peril.
Current Indian analysts mesmerized by the famed Sinhala hospitality
may not fully comprehend all of this. The new chumminess is interpreted
as Sri Lanka’s final acceptance of India’s regional super-power status.
Given the past history, and the subliminal Indophobia that still exists,
this is an obviously flawed assumption. The Sinhala leaders are acting
friendly today only for India’s help to crush the Tamil rebellion.
President Jayewardene once said at a news conference in Hong Kong, “the
Sri Lankan government will accept help from the devil himself” to fight
the Tamils. Currently the Sinhala leaders are consorting with the Indian
devil for this help.
A politically weakened Tamil population in Sri Lanka will in the long
run result in the realization of India's worst nightmare. Nothing can
be worse for India than a country in its backyard, ruled by an innately
hostile population. India needs a strong Tamil hand in Sri Lanka, and
the sooner it understands this basic fact the better it is for them.
A Chastened Indian Foreign Secretary, Jyotindra Dixit, six years
after his debacle in Sri Lanka, told me something privately, which he
didn’t (or couldn’t) say openly in his book,
Assignment Colombo (1998). He said to me “I say, if I were Prabakaran, I won’t trust any of the Sinhalas. Tell him that I told you so.”
I never have had the opportunity to tell Mr. Pirpaharan that.